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As historical recreations of Mexican history, the motion pictures Juárez (1939) and Viva Zapata! 
(1952) can undoubtedly be faulted. Although some have argued that they capture the spirit or the essence 
of the dramas they depict, factual errors, as we presently seem to understand those facts, are obvious in 
each film, as is a misplaced overall emphasis which endows these Mexican heroes with characteristics 
and motives they hardly possessed. But such criticism comes easy and misses the point. The movies were 
never  intended as  near-factual  historical  representations.  Juárez and  Zapata were  instead deliberately 
tailored  to  fit  contemporary concerns  in United States society and the movie industry itself,  thereby 
making each film a fascinating document for the study of that period in which they were produced. 
Hollywood in the late 30s was in a precarious position. Profits were off mainly due to increasing 
Axis domination of European motion picture markets which had formerly served American commercial 
needs1. Craft unionization in Hollywood caused strife and disrupted production2.The federal government 
was pursuing an anti-trust suit which threatened to divest production companies of their lucrative theater 
holdings3. And the House Un-American Activities Committee, then headed by Martin Dies of Texas, had 
begun to rant about supposed communist infiltration of the industry4.  Militant and broadly influential 
censorship groups, such as the Catholic Legion of Decency and the American Legion, threatened to throw 
up picket lines around theaters,  if film content did not meet their political and social designs5. And a 
number of states and municipalities exercised free-wheeling censorship which made life miserable for 
screenwriters  and  producers  alike6.  Hollywood,  in  short,  was  running  scared  and  the  threatening 
atmosphere  underlined  its  necessity  to  be  all  things  to  all  people,  to  entertain  everyone  and  offend 
nobody7. 
Although Hollywood and Washington strenuously deny it, the relationship between the industry 
and the U  .S.  Government  exists  in  a  vital  way.  The  government  seeks to  avoid charges  of  federal 
censorship, while the industry strives to maintain its facade of artistic freedom and free expression. All 
the while, they seek and enjoy one another’s support, and the relationship is often intimate at the highest 
levels. Most important in the long run, despite occasional conflict, in the main they scratch each other's 
backs.
For  example,  Washington  learned  in  early  1939  that  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer  intended  to 
dramatize the crash of the Imperial Airways flying boat  Cavalier which had crashed on its recent New 
York City to Bermuda flight. Three of 13 passengers had been killed, pointing up the hazards of flying. 
But that very week Eleanor Roosevelt was to christen a Pan American 74-passenger clipper inaugurating 
a trans-Atlantic flight  service which the government had heavily subsidized. G.S. Messersmith of the 
State  Department,  on March 1,  1939, hurried a note to Will  H. Hays,  president of the all-  powerful 
Motion Picture Producer's Association saying: 
"Keeping in mind that our government and our people have a very definite interest in the success 
of such trans-Atlantic flights, I believe that you will agree that it would be much more appropriate to 
dramatize the first successful flight by an American airliner than revive an already dead incident".8 
Hays, of course, agreed; MGM reacted to the movie czar's subsequent suggestion and dropped 
plans to make the picture.9 
The government rather quickly returned the favor. Harry Warner, who handled financial affairs 
for Warner Brothers, wrote confidentially to President Roosevelt on September 5, 1939, that he had just 
returned to New York from Great Britain, where blackouts, air raid precautions and the removal of urban 
population to rural districts had all but emptied motion picture houses in the big English cities. And with 
France falling into Nazi hands, “We will have to operate at a loss. For how long, who knows?” Warner 
further explained that with Hollywood besieged by federal litigation (of which the anti- trust suit was the 
most worrisome part), preparations for the defense of such cases had further drained the company of 
money, time and manpower. “If we are to work out of the difficulties imposed by the European war, [we] 
must be freed of [the] burden of litigation. Two-hundred and forty thousand employees of the Industry 
and hundreds of thousands of stockholders desire to avoid bankruptcy.”10 
Warner’s note to the President ended up on the desk of Henry Hopkins, secretary of commerce, 
who worked out a solution.11 The anti-trust case ended in a consent agreement on November 14, 1940, 
and the government agreed to press the issue no more.12 
Jack Warner had successfully managed Roosevelt's presidential campaign in California in 1932, 
the start of a friendship that lasted until the President's death. “It was no secret on the lot.” Warner writes 
in his autobiography, "that I admired Franklin Delano Roosevelt, that I had a personal friendship with him 
any  man would  envy,  and  that  I  had  been  a  guest  many times at  the  White  House."13 The  tone of 
Roosevelt's correspondence with Warner contained in the former president's papers, does indeed indicate 
that they were good buddies.14 One film Scholar states that the President frequently served as a technical 
advisor on Warner's  political  films, while Hal Wallis, the producer,  still  remembers  Mrs. Roosevelt’s 
frequent presence on the sets at Warner Brothers Burbank Studio.15 
In payment for his campaign services, Roosevelt had in 1932 offered Jack Warner a diplomatic 
position. Warner declined saying he was flattered, "But I think I can do better for your foreign relations 
with a good picture about America now and then."16 Shortly thereafter Roosevelt seized the opportunity to 
exercise the cultural arm of the Good Neighbor Policy. Latin America had long been an important market 
for U.S. motion pictures. Despite occasional complaints by a Latin government that a particular film had 
offended that nation's sensibilities, Latin audiences continued to pay to see Hollywood’s often derogatory 
stereotypes  of  themselves.  The  release  of  the  movie  Girl  of  the  Rio in  1932,  however,  so outraged 
Mexican feelings that it became part of the agenda at the 1936 Inter-American conference in Buenos 
Aires.17 As a  result  of  discussions about  movies  circulated  in  the hemisphere,  the American  nations 
agreed that pictures which insulted their national traditions or distorted history would not be shown in any 
member country.18 Jack Warner,  meanwhile,  awaited the opportunity to make his contribution to the 
Good Neighbor Policy. The needs of the studio and the government merged in 1938. 
Hollywood during much of the 1930s avoided pictures with overt political themes. The Hays 
office enforced the policy of making pictures for entertainment, not propaganda19. But the industry could 
not quarantine itself against world events. Motion picture personnel, some of them active leftists, founded 
the  Anti-Nazi  League  in  1936,  and  although  the  principally  Jewish  producers  sympathized  with  the 
League's condemnation of Nazi anti-semitism, they despised the organization’s flamboyance, because it 
focused  political  attention  on  the  industry20.  The  producers  proved  right.  Congressman  Martin  Dies 
relished the opportunity to make easy 1938 the new House Un-American Activities Committee had nosed 
its way into the movie world21. 
Congressman Dies charged that in their desire to combat European totalitarianism, the studios 
had gone soft on communism. Warner Brothers headed the producer's movement to defuse the attack. 
They cuddled up to the congressman. Dies claimed that Warners offered to make him vice-president of 
the United States,  or  at  second best,  to  produce  any sort  of  pro-American  movie  that  Dies  ordered. 
Asserting that he did not aspire to the vice presidency, Dies agreed to the idea of the $l-million motion 
picture. Planning began in 1939, but World War II shelved the project and temporarily put the House 
committee out of business. Dies himself never gave up. He suggested in 1940 that "communist influence 
was responsible for subtle but very effective propaganda which appeared in such films as Juárez..."22 
Juárez was indeed propagandistic, intentionally so, but not because of communist influence. By 
mid-1938, when the script-writing process on the film was well underway, the nation had begun to budge 
from its passive isolationist stance. North Americans were by no means yet interventionist-minded, but 
neither  were  they any longer  neutral.  Hitler's  persecutions  and racial  discrimination had,  as  William 
Langer and S. Everett  Gleason, state,  "grated against  the dislike of Americans for totalitarianism and 
dictatorship. German fascism violated moral codes, Christian values and ordinary decencies by which all 
civilized peoples aimed to abide...23 While Roosevelt still faced substantial opposition in his endeavor to 
get the United States more actively involved in European affairs, most Americans, even the staunchest 
isolationists,  agreed  that  strong  measures  should  be  taken  to  preserve  the  Western  Hemisphere  as 
democracy's fortress24. And the film industry was anxious to make a contribution. 
Roosevelt  planned  to  strengthen  commitments  among  the  American  nations  at  the  Inter-
American Conference scheduled for December, 1938, in Lima, Peru. Through the Producers Association, 
the movie industry joined the planning at the highest level. Will Hays wrote to Roosevelt on November 
18,  1938,  that  the industry would provide full  motion picture  coverage  of  the conference.  After  the 
meeting, the producers intended to send a camera crew around all of Latin America to produce sequences 
which could then be spliced into future newsreels. Hays worked closely with the State Department to 
refine the details and told the President that the industry's employees would photograph "such news as 
may be believed by the State Department to be of special value... Hollywood would, naturally, pay the 
bill. Furthermore, Hays assured that he had discussed other facets of Roosevelt's motion picture program 
for  Latin  America  with  the  producers  and  reported  that  "all  are  enthusiastic  to  co-operate  in  every 
possible way."25 
Warners,  it  should  be  said,  did  not  make  Juárez only  because  of  its  affection  for  the 
administration. Other factors also generated the project. As Jews, the brothers were naturally concerned 
with  Hitler's  ravages.  Their  German  agent,  a  Jew,  had  in  1935 been  murdered  by the  Nazis26.  The 
onslaught by the Dies committee commanded a reaffirmation of their patriotism, something the Warners 
genuinely felt.  In  addition,  with European  markets  closing,  Latin  America  beckoned.  The company's 
historical biography series which had produced Zola and The Life of Louis Pastor, had been well-received 
and merited extension. And Paul Muni,  their  most  popular  and expensive star,  needed  a new role27. 
Nonetheless, it was fundamentally the mood of the times which established the tone of the movie and 
ultimately decided its content. 
The script went through a dozen revisions, as the writers sought to make its arguments in the 
most simple, contemporary framework. Roosevelt warned the Nazis in his August 18, 1938, speech at 
Kingston, Ontario, that fascist adventures aimed at the New World would find the hemisphere united 
against them.28 Orders to the screen- writers were: “The dialogue, as far as it is political and ideological, 
must consist of phrases from today’s newspapers; every child must be able to realize that Napoleon in his 
Mexican intervention, is none other than Mussolini plus Hitler in their Spanish adventure.”29 
While the writers had no problem lifting lines from the daily newspapers for the casual dialogue 
of the actors, they struggled with the ideological concepts which were the crux of the motion picture. 
Franz  Werfel’s  1926  play, Juárez  and  Maximillian,  provided  a  dramatic  framework  for  the  motion 
picture, but failed Warner Brothers in its conclusion. In the play’s climatic scene, Maximillian says. “My 
idea of a radical monarchy was unreal... The age of royalty is over. In the shipwreck of the privileged 
classes, poor little kings who are not kings,  must perish. The house of dictators has come. Juárez [is 
here]”30. Such unnerving sentiments, however, did not long deter the writers. First they had Maximillian 
detail the advantages of enlightened monarchy to Porfirio Díaz. and then let Juárez straighten out Díaz 
later on. “You see, Porfirio:,” says the Mexican President, “when a monarch misrules, he changes the 
people; when a president misrules, the people change him.”31 Díaz emerged convinced, but would theater 
audiences? 
Warners anguished over the crucial dialogue. It seemed to the producers that Maximillian kept 
winning the debate.  The benevolence of Maximillian,  said one executive,  outweighed the tenacity of 
Juárez.32 Many reviewers of the movie also found the monarch more appealing than the president.33 One 
British critic scored Mexico for embracing Juárez and rejecting Maximillian.34 But the screenwriters faced 
a delicate problem. In their intention to make the picture contemporary, any denigration of enlightened 
monarchy  reflected  upon  Great  Britain,  democracy’s  major  deterrent  to  totalitarianism  and,  not 
incidentally, Europe’s largest remaining movie market. It was a dilemma the writers never could resolve. 
Similar concerns arose over the final and culminating speech of Juárez. Maximillian had been 
captured, and a delegation of European diplomats were pleading for his life. The President took them to 
task: “By what right, señores, do the great powers of Europe invade the lands of simple people, kill all 
who do not make them welcome, destroy their fields and take the fruit  of their toil from those who 
survive “  Maximillian,  the President  assured,  had  to  die  for  the collective  guilt  of  Europe.  Then  he 
continued: “The world must know that Mexico is not a spoil for the butchering, exploiting powers of your 
European civilization. We know that civilization, señores! For three hundred years we have endured it.”35. 
As the fascists were clearly contemporary Europe’s overt imperialists, the studio was certain audiences 
would put the blame where it belonged. But later the Cold War scrambled relations between the United 
States and the European states. So when the movie was re-released in 1952, Juárez's entire condemnation 
of European civilization was removed.36 
The ever-growing menace of World War II further altered the script even as they shot the film. 
The studio in earlier treatments intended to reveal the humanitarian side of democracy. Díaz in a late 
sequence urged Juárez to pardon Maximillian. Gazing at, a picture of Abraham Lincoln on the wall, Díaz 
asked the President, “What would he do. Don Benito? Democracy is a human thing… It is not cold, relent 
less justice.” Juárez with a cry of pain in his voice responded, “Do I not know ...? Do you think I want 
him to die?”37 The Munich crisis at this point intervened and further hardened attitudes toward the Nazis. 
With Democracy further threatened, Warners decided that humanitarianism had to be sacrificed and that 
Juárez well understood his duty. In the final version of the movie he fretted no more about the fate of the 
imperialist.38 
Regardless of a supposed appreciation for the courage and accomplishments of Juárez, Warners 
could not in 1939 trust the safety of the hemisphere to an apelike Zapotec aborigine,  as screenwriter 
Aneas MacKenzie had labeled him. In fact, in his personality sketch of the President, MacKenzie found 
Juárez rather obtuse. “It was typical of the Indian [Juárez]” the screenwriter explained, “that he did not 
foresee the obvious factor that was to make for him complete and final victory”- the intervention of the 
United States  with its  Monroe  Doctrine.39 Warners  insisted  that  the  present  threat  demanded similar 
leadership in the person of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the heritage of Abraham Lincoln. Actually, the 
analogy between Roosevelt and Lincoln was often made in the latter 1930s, and Warners aimed to make 
its characterization of Juárez unmistakingly Lincolnesque. The Emancipator would rally audience support 
to Roosevelt, besides such distortion made good box office. Since the advent of militant fascism, Lincoln 
had replaced Napoleon as the most popular historical figure with American film spectators.40 Muni was 
certainly ready for  the part.  In  the 1935 picture, Bordertown,  he had played  the role  of  a  Mexican-
American  attorney  whose  ideal  was  Lincoln,  and  in  democracy's  darkening  difficulties,  studios 
increasingly  turned  to  Lincoln  for  inspiration  and  determination.41 Warners  was  soon  to  release  a 
stridently patriotic documentary entitled. Lincoln in the White  House,  while Universal  studios shortly 
thereafter  starred  Henry  Fonda  as  Young  Mr.  Lincoln  (  1939)  and  RKO  followed  with  a  popular 
adaptation of Robert Sherwood’s  Abe Lincoln in Illinois (1940).42 Lincoln had once saved the stricken 
union and would do it again. Juárez was not only to emulate Lincoln, but to be Lincoln himself. 
Muni, who had direct control over his roles, himself insisted on the blend. Juárez, he said, must 
not only have a picture of Lincoln in his room, but the Presidents should directly correspond with one 
another. Juárez must not be an admirer from afar, but they should have actual contact. Muni dictated that 
when the assassination occurs. Lincoln’s portrait be draped in black so that he, acting through Juárez, 
could extol the virtues of the martyred president.43 This aura was reinforced by stage directions: “Omit the 
political  expedience  and  cold  calculation  of  the  gesture  and  make  it  a  movement  of  Linconian 
magnanimity,” and insure that the letter which Juárez writes to Maximillian is a “model of Lincolnian 
simplicity”44 
A good many other specific factors influenced details of the film, but space does not permitan 
exposition of these intriguing facets of the film’s final shape. Lines which might have offended British 
feelings were excised, as were references to the Catholic Church in deference to the Legion of Decency.45 
Mexican censors objected to sequences which indicated that the spiritual powers of the Catholic church 
superceded the temporal ones of the state.46 In the end, all references to the church were deleted. The 
Production  Code  Administration,  headed  by  the  puritanical  Joseph  Breen,  chipped  away  at  matters 
concerning sexual propriety, violence and vulgarity.47 Also, Muni’s vanity ran amuck during the actual 
shooting of the movie. He successfully demanded the elimination of several long scenes which developed 
audience  sympathy  for  the  human  qualities  of  Maximillian  and  Carlotta.  Bette  Davis,  who  played 
Carlotta, later wrote, “Mr. .Muni’s senority proved our downfall”48 
Juárez opened on April 25, 1939, at the Hollywood Theater in New York City. A special train 
from  Washington  D.C.,  brought  diplomatic  representatives  of  12  Latin  American  countries  to  the 
premiere, and audiences and critics generally praised the picture.49 Two weeks later it previewed before 
ranking government officials in Washington D.C., and Lawrence Duggan, chief of the State Department’s 
American Republics Division, in an unprecedented move, ordered the picture used to calculate  Latin 
American  attitudes  toward  the  United  States  and  democracy.  He  directed  the  nation’s  diplomats 
throughout Latin America to report on the film’s reception in their respective districts, and for the next 
year the embassies and consulates reported the rich and varied reaction to the movie.50 President Lázaro 
Cárdenas of Mexico thoroughly liked the picture, or at least thought it politically opportune to render the 
movie special treatment. Despite some adverse criticism, Cárdenas ordered the movie premiered in the 
nation ' s Palace of Fine Arts, the first motion picture ever to be shown in Mexico ' s foremost hall of 
culture.51 U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Josephus Daniels publicly termed the movie a “perfect picture” and 
“faithful  to  history”.  Privately he  told  the  State  Department  that  he  understood  the  North  American 
version of the movie had been edited to meet Mexican attitudes. Specifically, a scene which had credited 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  for  the  expulsion  of  the  French  was  deleted  in  Mexico.  Ambassador  Daniels 
explained:  “The  omission  of  that  scene  was  doubtless  in  deference  to  the  Latin  American  lack  of 
appreciation of how much all nations south of the Rio Grande owe to the [Monroe] Doctrine. Mexicans 
prefer  to  think Juárez  won the  victory  over  Maximillian  by their  own feats  of  arms  rather  than  by 
American representations to Napoleon, though the picture clearly shows that Juárez was an admirer of 
Lincoln …”52. So much for this country’s Good Neighbor Ambassador, Josephus Daniels. 
By this time, however, the employment of cinematic versions of Mexican heroes for political 
ends had moved toward the possibility of enlisting the agrarian rebel Emiliano Zapata in the fight for 
democracy. But Zapata proved to be a much more difficult character to control, and it took another dozen 
years of nervous hesitation before he finally emerged in movie theaters, by then a somewhat bedraggled 
victim of Cold War tensions. 
Plans for a Zapata movie emerged in 1938 from the desires of a Zapatista to lionize his hero in 
the United States and the ambitions of an energetic British writer to crown his long-term study of the 
Mexican Revolution. The Zapatista was Gildardo Magaña, close associate of Zapata during the rebellion 
and  in  1938 the  governor  of  the  state  of  Michoacan.  He had  collected  relics,  documents  and  other 
materials pertaining to the agrarian movement and had produced a two-volume biography of the guerilla 
chieftain. He wanted Zapata introduced to North Americans through an English translation of his work. 
Edgcomb Pinchon was the British author who intended to chronicle, as he put, “Mexico's 100 years of 
struggle for democratic govemment.”53 To the date he had produced three books on the subject, including 
Viva Villa from which the 1933 movie was adapted. But the lack of reliable source material had stymied 
Pinchon’s  work on Zapata.  Now, in  Magaña’s  collection, Pinchon saw the means of  completing his 
project, and he approached Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer to purchase the screen rights to his proposed book.54 
In  his hard-sell to the studio, Pinchon stressed his long-time knowledge of revolutionary Mexico, his 
personal relationship with Governor Magaña and President Cárdenas, but most importantly the immense 
contemporary value of a motion picture about Zapata. In short, such a movie, he predicted, would both 
reinforce  the  democratic  regime  of  Cárdenas  and  assure  United  States  hegemony in  Latin  America. 
Pinchon’s enthusiasm for the movie idea was unbounded. Listen to him: 
“The World is teetering between the enticements of dictatorship and democracy.  Show in the 
film a dictatorship at work -and Porfirio Díaz has Hitler and Mussolini back off the map! Show what 
happens-  the  final,  mad  desperate,  heroic  revolt.  Then  show the  denouement-  peace  and  home and 
happiness, freedom to be a man, go one’s own way and speak one’s mind. Show smashed the terrible link 
between governmental power and capitalist interest- for that is Fascism that must depend on the vilest 
impulses of  humanity for  existence-  Show that- and you  [will]  have...a  world document of immense 
preachment at this moment. And I say -do it big. Make it the answer. Done in gay skirts, big hats and 
brown skins -it is again the story of the Magna Carta on which ail democracy is based. 
...It  could  revivify the  waning  flame of  Democracy  in  the  English  speaking  world  (witness 
England  -and  Fascism here  [in  Mexico]).  It  could light,  like a  torch,  the almost  unkind led fires  of 
democracy in Latin America. It could be the answer – beautiful, sweeping, unanswerable to Mr. Hitler 
and Mr. Mussolini… Done in Spanish it could take Latin America for the U.S.A.! Let's do it right”.55 
MGM leaped at the bait. Pinchon, wrote his eulogy, Zapata, the Unconquerable, and the studio 
planned its picture. But World War II intervened. With Europe engulfed by Hitler's blitzkrieg, Roosevelt 
on August 16, 1940, created by executive order the Office for Co-ordination of Commercial and Cultural 
Relations between the American Republics, later to become more simply the Office of Inter-American 
Affairs.56 Its  mission was to root out Axis trade and propaganda penetration in Latin America and to 
replace them with U.S. brands of the same. Nelson A. Rockefeller headed the new agency with John Hay 
(Jock) Whitney his assistant in charge of the motion picture division. Hollywood eagerly joined the team. 
And in what must have been one of Rockefeller’s earliest decisions about motion picture potential in 
Latin America, he ordered the study of a movie about Emiliano Zapata.57 
The research assignment fell to Addison Durland, a Latin American specialist with the Motion 
Picture  Producers  Association,  which was enthusiastically  co-operating  with government's  intentions. 
History  proved  not  so  generous.  After  research  in  New  York's  Public  Library  and  other  resources, 
Durland reported Zapata far too controversial for cinematic treatment in Latin America. He counseled the 
Office of Inter-American Affairs to forget about Zapata as film material, and during the succeeding war 
years he gave similar advice to several studios which considered making a movie about the rebel.58 
Soon after the war the idea for a Zapata movie was revived through the spirited endeavors of 
Jack Cummings,  one of  MGM's  premiere  producers  and the nephew of Louis  B.  Mayer.  Cummings 
possessed a warmly romantic view of Mexico and in 1946 made several short pictorial movies which the 
Mexican government credited with increasing tourism in the country .The president, Miguel  Alemán, 
wanted to repay the favor. Cummings asked to do a picture about Zapata, and in mid-1947 he went to 
Mexico City with the screenwriter Lester Cole to arrange the details. Cole carried along his proposed 
outline of the picture, and evidently enthused the Mexicans with its rather radical and decidedly altruistic 
beat. Ranking members of Mexico's cinema industry and the government agreed to Co-operate on the 
project.59 Cummings and Cole returned to Metro ready to go to work, but the national temper had begun 
to change under the Cold War influence, and sensing their opportunities the politicians had determined to 
play rough. Many streamlets fed the mainstream of anti-communism which swept the country.  As one 
facet,  the House Un-American  Activities  Committee  dusted off  its  old machinery and remounted its 
attack on Hollywood. And the Committee' s yawning net soon caught Lester Cole.60 
The strategy behind and the results of the House Committee's attack on the movie industry are 
reasonably well-known and, at any rate, go beyond the intentions of this article. It suffices to say here that 
the Producers Association promised the federal government that the industry would not release movies 
which  did  not  accurately  portray  American  life  and  institutions,  a  deliberately  vague  catch-all that 
permitted arbitrary control of picture production. The State Department ordered its foreign missions to 
report on audience response to American films. Hollywood could then pitch its material accordingly. The 
industry also established a clearing house to furnish filmmakers with information about foreign cinematic 
concerns and to review screenplays and movies with an eye toward the elimination of material that might 
be offensive to foreign viewers.61 Hollywood had long engaged in assertive self-censorship in order to 
avoid outright federal  government restriction. But the House Committee was not to be deterred.  Cole 
claims  that  MGM's  management  was  especially  queasy  about  its  Zapata  movie.  Eddie  Mannix,  the 
studio's manager, had once blurted, “This bastard Zapata is a goddamn Committee revolutionary.” But the 
box office Potential of the Mexican drama calmed MGM's nerves, and the Studio decided to proceed. 
When the Un-American Activities Committee subpoenaed Cole, however, MGM became Convinced that 
Zapata had to go. Cole went on to defend himself as one of the Hollywood Ten, and on February 8, 1949, 
MGM sold for some $60,000 all its right to Zapata materials to Twentieth Century-Fox, which for several 
years had itself been considering a movie about Zapata, temporarily titled The Beloved Rogue.62 
Fox immediately hired John Steinbeck to write the screenplay,  a project  Steinbeck had been 
interested in for a number of years. While in Mexico in mid-1945, a film company approached Steinbeck 
to prepare just such a script, but the writer was already committed to other work. He still liked the idea, 
but asserted that he would only write it if the Mexican government assured him that he could accurately 
portray the historical events.63 Somewhere along the way Steinbeck lost his zeal for historical accuracy. 
As vice-president  in  charge  of  production,  Darryl  F,  Zanuck  guided  Twentieth  Century-Fox 
motion pictures with tight control and a strong hand. His influence pervaded the studio's movies often 
from their overall point of view to the smallest details. Zanuck' s job was to make movies that made 
money, and with him commercial considerations most always superceded artistic designs. He found Viva 
Zapata! a troublesome picture from the start.64 Although he engaged the highly regarded Elia Kazan to 
direct  the movie,  questions  of  content,  financial  potential,  possible  public  criticism,  and McCarthyte 
pressures continued to beset him. In fact, Zanuck lost faith in the movie soon after its release.65 
Steinbeck and Kazan began to collaborate on the screenplay in late 1949. Steinbeck wrote and 
Kazan rewrote. The novelist had during his recent years in Mexico collected a mass of material about 
Zapata which he molded into a storyline. Kazan and scenarists translated Steinbeck's prose into movie 
language.66 No documents better reveal the mental confusion which had beset the intellectual Left in post-
war America than the succession of Steinbeck/Kazan screenplays  which preceded the filming of  Viva 
Zapata! What began as an endorsement of revolution with determined leadership as the means to social 
change  ended  up  as  a  rejection  of  power,  strong  leadership  and  rebellion  in  favor  of  a  grass  roots 
democracy which promises little, if any , change at all.67 In discussing his shifting mind, Kazan said, “At 
the time, I was bewildered. I was anti-Stalinist and anti-McCarthy at the same time. It was difficult to 
reconcile the two”68 Such a position, it has been noted, was standard fare for the unglued Leftist of the 
1950s.69 For certain; Kazan was vociferously pro-American at the time. Anyhow, Lillian Hellman calls it 
all, “Pious bullshit.”70 
When he was working on the script  in 1949, Kazan envisioned Zapata  as a  social  climbing 
“snob”  with  a  New  Deal  mentality,  who  needed  to  be  “brought  down  to  the  bedrock  of  human 
circumstances.”  What  Zapata  lacked,  it  seems,  along  with  post-war  Americans,  was  a  social 
consciousness. As Kazan wrote then on his Zapata script, “The very meaning of conscience today is 
responsibility for the unfortunate or the less fortunate of our fellow men. Zapata eventually understands 
this premise and leads his people's struggle for land and freedom.”71 When the picture was released three 
years later, the director' s entire perspective of Zapata had changed, as had Kazan ' s Cold War stance. 
The movie, he now said, concerned power, and how power corrupts even the best intentioned leadership. 
Zapata  had  been  corrupted,  although  before  riding  to  his  destiny  at  Chinameca,  he  recognized  that 
genuine power resides in the “people” and the values of democracy.72 Zapata, who in 1949, had led his 
people  in  triumphant  rebellion,  had  by 1953 become a  flawed human being,  complex  and  beset  by 
contradictions.  He  was heroic  because  he  tried,  even  if  he  failed.  “But  then  progress  everywhere," 
explained Kazan, “comes only slowly and in small increments.”73 
In the climactic sequence of Steinbeck's earliest script, a well-meaning hacendado, who had at 
first  scorned Zapata'  s  violence,  says  to the guerilla  in the end: “You know, Emiliano,  caught  up in 
business, perhaps I did not think about things clearly…You were right, Emiliano.” Zapata's head jerks up 
and he stares at the hacendado, who continues: “I know now you had to fight. You see, Emiliano, because 
the world moves on slowly and majestically, I forgot the thousand little agonies that make it move. Just as 
a man may rise from a chair because a single nerve twitches on his body. so perhaps is progress in the 
world stimulated by aching Emilianos. I know this now. And so I think you are a good man.”74 
In later treatments, the hacendado is eliminated and Zapata tells his countrymen: “You've looked 
for  leaders.  Strong  men without  faults.  There  aren't  any.  There  are  only men like  yourselves.  They 
change. They desert. They die. There are no leaders but yourselves -a strong people is the only lasting 
strength”75
If violence does not lead to change, Zapata, the violent, had to be cast as a failure at the end of 
the movie.  Steinbeck eventually did just that. His original  finale took place in an unspecified future. 
Townspeople filled their  water  jugs  at  a fountain topped with a  small  bronze bust  of  Zapata.  In  the 
background was a school called “Escuela Emiliano Zapata,” and inside the children sang. “And so he was 
not dead. And no one was beaten anymore. And no one dared to steal the land again. And the crops grew 
freely. And the people were not afraid. And so he’s alive.”76 But in the finished movie there is no such 
assurance of progress. Zapata is no more than a memory in the guise of a white horse retreating into the 
mountains. The people are miserable. The federal army is intact and entirely able to crush them, despite 
their new found defense in democracy. It is a very bad scene for the campesinos of Morelos77 
Darryl  F.  Zanuck had eventually had enough.  It  was late  December,  1950, and filming was 
scheduled  to  begin  the  following spring.  Steinbeck  and  Kazan  continued  to  wallow  in  ideological 
confusion. Maybe the entire project should be cancelled. Zanuck asked the writers, “What are we trying 
to say in this story? Why are we particularly making this picture? What do we finally say when the story 
is over?” “Frankly, I do not know.” Then a Zanuck concern: “I hope people don't get the impression that 
we are advocating civil war as the only means to peace.”78 
The producer doubted that the movie should terminate saying, “Mexico turned into a very nice 
place  devoid  of  political  corruption.”  Mexico,  he  understood,  had  progressed.  “Some  of  the  recent 
elections sound almost like they are on the level. And whether it is true or not, I am certain we can 
attribute some of this to Zapata.”79 
Noting that he had a particular stake in the financial consequences of the movie, Zanuck sensed 
the down-beat ending had to be changed. “I want to have the audience rooting for us and rooting for 
Zapata.” While the hero dies, his ideals live. But what were Zapata 's ideals? Zanuck had the answer: 
“Certainly it isn’t communism, and we want to make this very clear because, frankly, in the present script 
there is inadvertently a peculiar air about certain speeches which might be interpreted by the communists 
to claim that we are subtly working for them.” It seemed to Zanuck that Zapata had a few well-informed 
companions. One was Pablo, who had earlier been to Texas to see Francisco Madero. Zanuck surmised, 
“Pablo must have told Zapata abut a little country known as the United States of America… It seems to 
me that Zapata must have heard about free elections and a government run by the people, for the people.” 
Zanuck wanted emphasis put on “free elections” “It seems to me that Zapata has a pretty good pattern for 
a democratic government in his neighbor, the United States -only one civil war in 170 years. I am sure 
that Zapata must have asked the question many times: ‘How do they do it in the United States?’” 80 
So much for the intended message of Viva Zapata! Zanuck still had serious reservations about 
featuring a Mexican revolutionary hero during such tense times in Hollywood and the nation. He did not 
believe audiences would directly apply its story to world conditions of that time, nor would they learn any 
subversive lessons from it. Yet, the film, as history, would carry some significance for the viewers -and 
that could result in difficulties for the studio.81 
“Of course” he said, “I suppose if it is a very great entertainment, loaded with theatre, and if the 
audience  sits  on the edge  of the seats  in  the last  act,  and if  underneath  it  all  it  has a  small  cry for 
democracy, audiences will love it and not ask any questions.”82 Zanuck then told Steinbeck and Kazan to 
ponder his remarks and to help him decide whether or not the production should continue.83 
Well, it did get filmed, but under extreme duress, all the details of which we do not now have 
space to consider. The Mexican government in concert with the recommendations of the country's cinema 
industry  refused  to  permit  any  part  of  the  Zapata  story  to  be  filmed  in  Mexico.  It  simply  did  not 
appreciate the equivocal Zapata designed by Steinbeck and Kazan.84 The studio had difficulty deciding 
who to cast in the film. Should the major parts be played by Mexicans speaking dubbed English, or by 
North  Americans  with  an  occasional  dubbed  Mexican  accent?85 Mexican  censors  forced  numerous 
changes, including the title, from The Tiger to Viva Zapata! The censors thought The Tiger suggested a 
bloodthirsty Zapata. The Mexicans also objected to comparisons drawn between democratic practices in 
the respective countries. Zanuck agreed to a long series of changes in the Mexican version of the motion 
picture in order to meet that nation’s requirements.86 Even with the adjustments, the movie failed badly in 
Mexico, where it played to one week of jeers and then was withdrawn.87 
Characteristics of major figures in the movie underwent continuing adjustment as the filmmakers 
struggled to fit them in to an ideologically safe and dramatically sound framework. Emiliano' s brother, 
Eufemio; his major intellectual prop, Pablo; Zapata' s wife and mistress,  and his president, Madero, all 
experienced changing interpretations as the writers suffered from one screenplay to the next.88 None of 
them, however, underwent the manipulation experienced by the figure “Bicho”, alias “Fernando”, really 
Joseph Wiseman, that mysterious and sinister opportunist in black who surfaced periodically at the elbow 
of power. Bicho became Fernando only in the final stage of the film' s production. Zanuck preferred the 
name Bicho, because it sounded harsh and mean. But when the Mexican censors explained that “Bicho” 
meant “bug” or some kind of vermin in Spanish, the producer retreated to Femando.89 There was no such 
character in Steinbeck' s original treatments of the Zapata story. When Fernando first appeared, he was 
only an insignificant character in the plot, but as the Cold War heightened along with the pressures of the 
HUAC, Fernando grew in stature -as a villain. The studio felt that the public had to be assured beyond 
question that Zapata (Democrat) was right and that Fernando (Opportunistic totalitarian) was wrong. The 
argument had virtually been the same with  Juárez in 1939. The Mexican heroes were all along good 
democrats, only by 1952 Stalin replaced Hitler as the raging dictator. 
Before approving the U.S. release of Viva Zapata!, the Breen Office demanded cuts in scenes it 
considered  too  violent,  vulgar  or  immoral.90 Zanuck  himself  ordered  further  deletions.  In  a  major 
sequence that has Zapata in the presidential palace, an old- time compadre and general in Zapata’ s army, 
advises his chief to make his peace with his enemies, meaning Venustiano Carranza. “We can 't wipe out 
the opposition,” says the weary fighter. “We must learn to live with it.” Zanuck eliminated that entire 
scene. Locked in a Cold War with the Soviet Union, compromises. he explained, are not possible. “I don 
't pretend to know the answer “, Zanuck said, “but it seems to me we are having a difficult time both in 
living with the Communists and in wiping them out. It seems to me that when the opposition decides to 
devour you, you have to do a little devouring yourself- or submit.”91 Zanuck clearly reflected prevalent 
Cold War thinking, and SO did his movie, not entirely by what it said, but just as importantly, by what 
was left out. 
Zanuck also had immediate political and personal  considerations. He objected to verbal slurs 
about military generals in the movie. Political reality invited discretion. “Our next President of the United 
States” he noted, “is very apt to be a General named Dwight Eisenhower, and this picture is apt to be out 
of line in addition, I myself am still a colonel in the reserves, and I may have to be taking orders from 
generals”92 Darryl Zanuck was ready to reject those communists, just like his Emiliano Zapata. 
I  must  conclude. Juárez,  it  seems to  me,  was  more  directly  bent  by deliberate  government 
intentions than was Viva Zapata!, although a study of yet closed State Department records could alter that 
opinion.  And I certainly do not mean to  imply that  government  pressure  did not  shape  Zapata.  The 
government's position vis-a-vis the film industry was quite different in 1939 than in 1952, but in both 
periods it exerted enormous pressure on Hollywood and significantly influenced the content of motion 
pictures. Needs and tensions within the industry itself further designed each film, as did the mental set of 
the filmmakers themselves. Warner Brothers and its filmmakers knew precisely what they wanted to say -
and said it. Zanuck also had his mental set, but never could extract his picture from the intellectual morass 
in  which  Steinbeck  and  Kazan  had  become  mired.  But  beyond  these  rather  direct  influences,  the 
individuals who produced these two movies carried into them the tensions, values, attitudes and morals of 
the entire society in which they lived and worked. All of these factors combined, I believe, to give us two 
remarkable historical documents which help to illuminate the times in which they were made.
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